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involved" and "their constitutional rights." The court states: "[W]e
are unable to join in the view that the petitioners' constitutional rights
have been afforded them."''1
This pluralization of the term "right"
plus the emphasis placed upon the right to communicate with counsel
leads to the conclusion that this right is intended to be included among
the constitutional rights referred to. Further, the court added that "due
process of law implies the right and opportunity to be heard and to pre'22
pare for the hearing.
Accordingly, in view of the strongly-worded North Carolina statute,
the intimations of the North Carolina court in the Wheeler case, the longstanding decisions of courts in three other states, and the strong minority
on the United States Supreme Court, it is submitted that the officer of
the law in North Carolina would be wise to adhere strictly to both the
letter and the spirit of this state's statute, and that any person who is
accused of crime and who desires to contact counsel, friends, or relatives
should be permitted to do so promptly and as soon as reasonably possible. To do otherwise might well be held in violation of a state constitutional 23 and statutory right as well as a denial of the federal guarantee
24
of due process.
RAYMOND

M.

TAYLOR

Constitutional Law-Obscenity Statute-Proof of Scienter
In Smith v. California' the defendant bookseller had been convicted
under a Los Angeles city ordinance which made it unlawful "for any
person to have in his possession any obscene or indecent writing, or
'2
book ... in any place where ... books . . . are sold or kept for sale.
Thus scienter was not an element of the crime. The United States
Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the ordinance was
unconstitutional as a violation of the first amendment right of freedom
of the press.3 The Court reasoned that under the Constitution knowledge
of the obscene contents was necessary for conviction of a crime involving
has the duty to make a "reasonable effort" on behalf of the defendant to contact
his relatives. If one were to consider a relative as not necessarily either counsel
or friend, the court could be interpreted as extending the accused's right in this
respect. Therefore, one arrested logically could contact a minimum of three persons: (1) counsel, and (2) friend, both as provided in the statute, and (3) relative,
as covered by the courts suggestion. The use of the plural term "friends" and
"relatives" perhaps could authorize communication with more than one representative2 1from each of these classes.
1Id. at 194, 105 S.E.2d at 621.
2
Id. at 193, 105 S.E.2d at 621. (Emphasis added.)
N.C. CoNsT. art 1, §§ 11, 17.
24 Also, the North Carolina statute contains this provision: "Any officer who
shall violate the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall
be fined or imprisoned, or both, in the discretion of the court."

'361 U.S. 147 (1959).
' Los

ANGELEs, CAL.,

MUNICIPAL CoDE

'U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.

§ 41.01.1.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
possession of obscene literature because of the preferred status of constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and speech. 4 Further, the
Court stated that such an ordinance would force a bookseller to restrict
the books he sells to those he has inspected, and this burden of selfimposed prior restraint would restrict constitutionally protected literature as well as obscene literature.5
The Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan, 6 refused to pass
on the question of what constitutes scienter saying only:
We might observe that it has been some time now since the law
viewed itself as impotent to explore the actual state of a man's
mind .

. .

. Eyewitness testimony of a bookseller's perusal of a

book hardly need be a necessary element in proving awareness of
its contents. The circumstances may warrant the inference that
he was aware of what a book contained, despite his denial.7
It is settled that the sale of obscene literature is not protected by the
first amendment.8 The principal case, however, establishes that the
possessor of obscene literature is protected to the extent that he cannot be convicted by a state of a crime involving obscene literature unless
knowledge of the obscenity is a requisite of the crime. 9 The questions
of the type and quantity of evidence necessary to prove such knowledge
remain for future interpretation.'0 There are four cases that deal directly
with these problems.'1
In State v. Miller,1 2 a case involving obscene pictures, the West Vir'Strict liability may be imposed by public welfare laws such as anti-narcotic
or pure food laws. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1914) ; United States v.
Sprague, 208 Fed. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1913). However, such cases as these are distinguishable because first amendment freedoms are not involved.
' This decision seems sound. "It is not the book that is on trial; it is a person.
The conduct of the defendant is the central issue, not the obscenity of a book or
picture." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (concurring opinion).
' There were three concurring opinions. Justice Black concurred in the result
reasoning that any obscenity statute will restrict freedom of the press. 361 U.S. at
155-60. Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result, but questioned what would
be needed to prove scienter. Id. at 160-67. Justice Douglas concurred in the result
on the ground that freedom of expression can be suppressed only when that expression "is so closely brigaded with illegal action as to be a part of it." Id. at 168.
Justice Harlan concurred in part and dissented in part. He would not have
reached the scienter question but would have reversed on the ground that the trial
judge excluded all evidence as to "contemporary community standards" with regard
to the
7 test of obscenity. Id. at 169-72.
Id. at 154.
' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
' The first amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press are made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Near
v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
"0The Court recognized the problem. Justice Frankfurter said, "A bookseller
may ... be well aware of the nature of a book . . . without having opened its
cover, or, in any true sense, having knowledge of the book." 361 U.S. at 164.
"'-United States v. Hochman, 175 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Wis. 1959); People v.
Wepplo, 78 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P.2d 853 (1947); People v. Schenkman, 195
N.Y.S.2d 570 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1960) ; State v. Miller, 112 S.E.2d 472 (W. Va.

iai12 S.E.2d 472 (W. Va. 1960).
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ginia Supreme Court distinguished Smith v. California on the facts,
saying, "Certainly anyone who distributes such pictures would know
what he is distributing and the element of scienter is not necessary in
such a case."' Is Further the court held that knowledge of the character
of the obscene pictures would be presumed and "the defendant may, by
proper evidence, excuse or justify"'14 the distribution of such pictures.
In People v. Schenkman,15 the only other reported case interpreting
Smith v. California, four booksellers and a bookstore owner were prosecuted for illegal sale of obscene literature. The court discussed the
sufficiency of the evidence relating to scienter. Though there was no
direct evidence of knowledge on the part of the defendants, the court
found as a fact that they had knowledge of the contents of the books
relying on the following evidence: (1) Each of the four books found to
be obscene was a paperback book priced at five dollars. (2) The titles
of the books were "Queen Bee, ....
Succulent," "Garden of Evil," and
"Bloomer Boy." (3) On the back of one of the books was the statement,
"The kind of book you always wished could be published. Nothing is
hidden .... A tale that is wider and more sizzling than a barrel of sly
French novels. A Roman orgy is tame compared to some of the bedroom scenes."'16 The admission of such evidence and its sufficiency
would seem to be in line with past decisions concerning obscenity statutes
where scienter was a part of the definition of the crime.
In United States v. Hochnan'7 the defendant was charged with
knowingly taking from a common carrier copies of obscene publications
transported in interstate commerce.' 8 The district court held that there
was sufficient evidence to justify the jury's finding of scienter in that
the obscene books were paperback books selling for three dollars, the
titles and illustrations were suggestive, 19 the defendant was a college
graduate experienced in the book business, 20 and had personally selected
21
the books from the shelves of a wholesaler.
Il Id. at 478.
'"Ibid.

N.Y.S.2d 570 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1960).
"6The conversations between the defendants and the arresting officers were also
admitted as evidence. One defendant had said that he sold the books to anyone who
wanted to buy them. Another said that he did not think the books were so bad.
Still another read to the officer from a medical work dealing with sex and stated
that the questioned books were not as bad. The fourth said he knew the books
were in the store for sale. The fifth is not reported as having said anything. Id.
at 572-73.
" 175 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Wis. 1959).
"8In violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1958).
19 The titles and illustrations, said the court, "are such as to put an intelligent
person on notice of the type of books which they were." 175 F. Supp. at 882.
20 It was not admitted in evidence nor mentioned in the opinion that the defendant had been convicted two years earlier of selling obscene material in violation
of a state statute. State v. Hochman, 2 Wis. 2d 410, 86 N.W.2d 446 (1957).
"The court said, "The jury could aelieve that he at least thumbed through the
15195

books.'

175 F. Supp. at 882.
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In a 1947 California case, People v. Wepplo,22 the state statute
required that the seller know the character of the obscene work.23 The
book in question bore "no marks or indications of its character on the
outside, nor was its title enlightening or even suggestive on the subject."' 24 In the absence of other evidence of knowledge, defendant's conviction was reversed.
These four cases seem to raise several problems in regard to proof
of scienter. The courts emphasized the fact that the books involved
were paperbacks selling for from three to five dollars. The New York
court in People v. Schenkman stated, "When, therefore, a paper covered
book is sold by a book seller for $5.00, can it be truthfully said that he
did not know that the sale was induced by the fact that the book contained hard core pornography ... ?"25 But it is evident that paperback
books could be priced at five dollars because of their legitimate content
rather than their pornographic content. Further, the outside of a book
could be highly suggestive because of the title and statements on the
cover, while in fact the contents could be completely innocent. Such a
book would not be obscene because the whole work must be obscene
before the book may be classed as obscenity. 26 Finally, a bookseller
could be well educated and highly experienced in the book business,
and yet, because of the number of books handled in his establishment
have no knowledge of the contents of a particular book.
Thus far the North Carolina Supreme Court has not dealt with the
problems concerning the type and quantity of evidence necessary to prove
guilty knowledge in obscenity cases. However, in 1957 the North
Carolina legislature adopted the American Law Institute's Model Penal
Code provisions relating to obscenity.27 This statute contains a provision that possession of obscene matter raises a presumption that the
seller knows the contents.2 8 This provision would seem to be clearly
29
opposed to the spirit and letter of the decision in Smith v. California.
The state could introduce in evidence the obscene work, establish the
fact that the defendant had possessed it, and this with the aid of the
'278 Cal. App. 2d 959, 178 P.2d 853 (1947).
2" CAL. PENAL CODE § 311.
21178 P.2d at 858.
23
2 195 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
' Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
27 MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.10 (Tent. draft No. 6, 1957) was incorporated as
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-189.1 (Supp. 1959).

189 (1958).

See generally Note, 36 N.C.L. Rv.

possesses, or procures obscenity is
2" "A person, firm, or corporation who . ..
presumed to know th~e existence of its parts, features or contents of the material
which
render it obscene." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-189.1(f) (Supp. 1959).
2
' In State v. Mapp, 166 N.E.2d 387 (Ohio 1960), the Ohio Supreme Court, by
a four-to-three majority, held that a statute making knowing possession of obscene
literature, with or without intent to sell, a crime was opposed to the general principles of Smith v. California in that such a blanket restriction would keep persons
from reading many books for fear they might be obscene. Because of a provision
of the Ohio Constitution, the statute was allowed to stand.
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presumption would support a conviction if the defendant failed to rebut
it. In this manner the defendant would be convicted without actual
proof of scienter. Further this provision is in conflict with the Supreme
Court's holding in Speiser v. Randall30 which prohibits a state from
shifting the burden of proof to the defendant when the crime charged
involves a limitation placed upon freedom of speech. The analogy would
seem clearly to be that the burden could not be shifted to the defendant
when the statute involved a limitation placed upon freedom of the press.
It is submitted that the legislature should reconsider this apparently unconstitutional provision.
CHARLES E. DAMERON III
Estate and Gift Taxation-Discretionary TrustGrantor As Life Beneficiary
A useful and not uncommon trust arrangement is one that gives the
trustee absolute discretion to pay income to the grantor or to accumulate
it for the remaindermen. For additional flexibility a controllable power
to invade principal is often lodged in the trustee to insure that the grantor
will not be financially embarrassed should an unforeseen emergency arise.
This Comment is concerned primarily with the federal estate tax consequences of such a trust although the basic gift tax consequences are
developed as a corollary. Although it appears that the tax law affecting
such trusts has not been definitively developed, trends in some areas seem
clearly discernible. On the other hand, to the writer's surprise, many
pertinent areas seem never to have been considered by the authorities.
For purposes of this Comment an inter vivos trust of the following
basic outline will be assumed: the independent trustee has absolute discretion to pay income to the grantor for life or to accumulate; the trustee,
pursuant to ascertainable external standards,' is empowered to invade
principal for the grantor's benefit; the grantor has no other interests in
or power over the trust; the remaindermen must survive the grantor;
the trust is governed by North Carolina law.
The problem is whether the interests reserved by the grantor will
cause inclusion of the corpus in his gross estate by virtue of the incomplete inter vivos transfer sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
chiefly sections 2036(a) (1) and 2037. Also to be considered are the
steps that the grantor of such a trust might take to rid himself of the
tax-risky interests.
8

1

357 U.S. 513 (1958).

E.g., "support, maintenance, and educational needs." It has been held that a
state court determination of what is or is not an ascertainable standard is not
binding in federal tax cases. Michigan Trust Co. v. Kavanagh, 137 F. Supp. 52
(E.D. Mich. 1955). Contra, LOWNDES &KRaim, FEmDEAL EsTATE & Girt TAXES
198 (1956), declaring that it is a matter of local law.

